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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The complexity of modern day civil litigation has created unique 
pressures on the American legal system.  Many cases now entail multiple 
parties, dozens of witnesses, and unprecedented amounts of discovery.  
Disputes involving securities regulation, civil rights, and mass torts have 
tested the limits of court administration and case management.  And 
somewhere within this evolving legal terrain stands the civil jury: 
laypersons who must weigh increasingly complex evidence and determine 
fault, liability, and causation. 
As courts struggle to develop new procedures to manage their expanding 
civil dockets, the jury trial often becomes a focus of attention.  Although the 
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right 
to a jury trial in most federal civil suits, some scholars and judges have 
questioned whether modern day cases are too complex for jurors to decide 
properly.  A tension has developed between the right to a jury trial and 
effective judicial management of complex litigation. 
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The Supreme Court‘s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
1
 aimed to relieve some of this tension by giving 
federal judges gatekeeping power over what expert evidence reaches the 
jury.
2
  The Court reasoned that, if juries never saw confusing, unreliable, or 
inaccurate evidence, then their decisions would more likely be based on an 
appropriate understanding of the facts instead of other superficial 
considerations.
3
  Despite these good intentions, Daubert‘s practical effect 
within the legal system has been the erosion of the right to a civil jury trial 
because judges often use their gatekeeping power to block cases from ever 
reaching the jury.  In short, courts are using Daubert in a way that 
circumvents the Seventh Amendment. 
This Article begins by reviewing the history, purpose, and function of the 
Seventh Amendment within the American constitutional system.  It then 
discusses the Supreme Court‘s analytical framework for preserving the 
fundamental features of the right to a civil jury trial while simultaneously 
permitting rational legal development of the jury system.  Next, the Article 
provides a brief overview of the Court‘s Daubert jurisprudence, and argues 
that the creation of judicial gatekeeping has caused an institutional shift of 
adjudicatory authority away from juries and into the hands of judges in 
violation of the Seventh Amendment.  The Article concludes by suggesting 
three legal reforms that would achieve many of the same goals of Daubert 
without infringing on the jury‘s constitutionally protected fact-finding 
power. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
The Founding Fathers cherished the right to trial by jury.
4
  Indeed, ―its 
deprivation at the hands of the English was one of the important 
grievances‖ leading to the American Revolution.5 The Declaration of 
Independence even cites the lack of jury trials as one of the gravest injuries 
against free people, ―having in direct object the establishment of an absolute 
Tyranny over [the] States.‖6  Records from early American history are filled 
with references to juries serving as ―anchors‖ in society that prevent the 
State from straying too far from principles of republican governance.
7
  
 
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
2. Id. at 597. 
3. See id. at 592. 
4. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
5. Id. 
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see id. para. 20 (―For depriving us in 
many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.‖). 
7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
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Although the Founders often spoke of the importance of criminal juries, 
they viewed civil juries with similar reverence.
8
  Patrick Henry even 
described the right to trial by jury in civil suits as ―one of the greatest 
securities to the rights of the people, [which] ought to remain sacred and 
inviolable.‖9 
To be sure, the Framers were most concerned about protecting personal 
liberties from an oppressive executive, but they were equally weary of an 
oppressive judiciary.
10
  Many of the debates at the 1787 Continental 
Congress involved creating government structures that minimized the 
potential for judicial oppression.
11
  From these debates, the civil jury 
emerged ―as [a] necessary... counterbalance [to] an invigorated judiciary.‖12  
After Hugh Williamson suggested the ―necessity‖ of a provision to secure 
the right to jury trials in civil cases,
13
 Elbridge Gerry concurred by stating 
that civil juries were indispensible safeguards against ―corrupt Judges.‖14  
Agreement about the importance of this judicial counterbalance was so 
widespread that it was even suggested that Article III, Section 2 be 
amended to include language preserving the ―usual‖ right to civil jury 
trials.
15
  For many at the Convention, ―the jury represented the most 
effective means available to secure the independence and integrity of the 
judicial branch of the colonial government.‖16  In short, the Founders 
viewed the jury as an important bulwark against all forms of government 
oppression,
17
 including judicially created injustices.
18
 
 
JEFFERSON 269 (Julian Boyd ed., 1958). 
8. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 
664 (1973).  Alexis de Tocqueville also commented on the importance of civil jury trials in the new 
American nation: ―Juries, especially civil juries, instill some of the habits of the judicial mind into every 
citizen, and just those habits are the very best way of preparing people to be free.‖  ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274 (Jacob Peter Mayer ed., 2000). 
9. Edith Guild Henderson, Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 298 (1966) 
(quoting a debate on the ratification of the Bill of Rights). 
10. See Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 579, 618 (1993). 
11. Id. at 580–81. 
12. Id. at 581. 
13. MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 587 (1911). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 628. 
16. Landsman, supra note 10, at 596. 
17. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 
343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing jury trials as an ―important bulwark against tyranny 
and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to 
that of the judiciary‖). 
18. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (―The purpose of a jury is to guard against 
the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a 
hedge against the . . . overconditioned or biased response of a judge.‖); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
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Based on the Framers‘ strong support of civil juries, it may seem 
counterintuitive that the Constitution emerged from the Continental 
Congress without a reference to jury trials.
19
  But in all likelihood, this 
omission was not due to anti-jury sentiment; instead, it resulted because the 
Framers viewed the right to trial by jury as so inextricably linked to the new 
constitutional system that including language specifically preserving it was 
unnecessarily repetitive.
20
  Moreover, ―[t]he right to trial by jury was 
probably the only one universally secured by the first American state 
constitutions.‖21  And because the states had sufficiently protected the right 
to a civil jury trial, the new Constitution did not need to do the same.
22
 
Regardless of the reason why the new Constitution did not mention the 
civil jury, its omission ―triggered a firestorm of protest.‖23  The Anti-
federalists led the attack.
24
  One of their most prevalent and persuasive 
criticisms of the new Constitution was its lack of any provision securing the 
right to civil jury trials.
25
  ―The Anti-Federalists insisted that the 
Constitution should explicitly recognize the traditional procedural rights....  
The most important of these was the trial by jury.‖26  Patrick Henry, Samuel 
Adams, and George Mason rallied opposition to the Constitution ―by 
asserting that [it] would abolish civil juries altogether,‖ thereby giving 
judges nearly unencumbered power to constrain personal liberties.
27
  Jury 
trials were thus necessary to restrict judicial discretion and further the 
interests of democracy.
28
 
 
145, 156 (1968) (―Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an 
inestimable safeguard . . . against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.‖). 
19. Notably, Mr. Gerry voted against ratification, in part, because Article I seemingly gave Congress 
the power ―to establish a tribunal without juries.‖  FARRAND, supra note 13, at 632–33. 
20. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 656. 
21. Id. at 655 (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 
IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1960)). 
22. See id. 
23. Landsman, supra note 10, at 598. 
24. Id. at 599. 
25. See Henderson, supra note 9, at 295 (―The almost complete lack of any bill of rights was a principal 
part of the Anti-Federalist argument; the lack of provision for civil juries was a prominent part of this 
argument . . . .‖); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 289 (Alexander Hamilton) (David Wooton ed., 
2003) (―The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this state, and 
perhaps in several of the other states, is that relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial 
by jury in civil cases.‖ (emphasis omitted)); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE 
FOR 64 (1981) (―[O]ne of the most widely uttered objections against the Constitution was that it did not 
provide for (and thus effectively abolished) trial by jury in civil cases.‖).  See generally Wolfram, supra 
note 8, at 669–73 (reviewing the Anti-federalist attacks on the new Constitution). 
26. STORING, supra note 25, at 64. 
27. Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How To Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 
53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1009 (1992). 
28. See Landsman, supra note 10, at 600; cf. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 671–72. 
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The Federalists responded to these criticisms by arguing that the absence 
of a specified right in the proposed Constitution did not mean that the right 
was abolished.
29
  Alexander Hamilton, for example, agreed that the civil 
jury system was a ―valuable check upon corruption,‖30 and he eventually 
wrote Federalist Paper 83 to respond to the Anti-federalists‘ charge that the 
new Constitution would destroy the right to a civil jury trial.
31
  In it, 
Hamilton confirmed that the right‘s omission from the Constitution was due 
to disagreements about whether such a provision was necessary, not 
whether the right was important: 
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in 
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if 
there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a 
valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free 
government.
32
 
In sum, records surrounding the Constitution‘s ratification reveal a broad 
consensus that civil jury rights were an important element of free society.  
―The only disagreement seems to be over whether civil jury rights were the 
most important of all individual rights, or simply one of the most important 
rights.‖33  For that reason, amending the Constitution to memorialize the 
right to a civil jury trial was relatively uncontroversial.  After a brief debate, 
the First Congress passed the Seventh Amendment on September 25, 1789, 
which became effective on December 15, 1791.
34
  The amendment 
provides: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law.
35
 
 
[T]he anti-federalists were not arguing for the institution of civil jury trial in the belief 
that jury trials were short, inexpensive, decorous and productive of the same decisions 
that judges sitting without juries would produce.  The inconveniences of jury trial were 
accepted precisely because in important instances . . . the jury would reach a result that 
the judge either could not or would not reach.  Those who favored the civil jury . . . 
avowed that important areas of protection for litigants in general, and for debtors in 
particular, would be placed in grave danger unless it were required that juries sit in civil 
cases. 
Id. 
29. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 25, at 290. 
30. Id. at 291. 
31. See Stanton D. Krauss, Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 
U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 416 (1999). 
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 25, at 292. 
33. Klein, supra note 27, at 1010. 
34. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 725–26. 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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By preserving the right to civil jury trials, the Seventh Amendment 
diffused adjudicatory power among ―neighbors and equals,‖ thereby 
reducing the risk of judicial oppression.
36
 
This Article proceeds by placing the Seventh Amendment‘s history at the 
forefront of its analysis.  Our Founders considered the right to a civil jury 
trial to be a vital check on judicial power.
37
  Thus, any institutional shift of 
adjudicatory authority away from the jury and into the hands of a state 
actor—judges—must be viewed skeptically. 
III.  HOW HAVE COURTS INTERPRETED THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT? 
A.  The Jury as an Independent Constitutional Actor 
Historically, the federal courts have been uneasy with judicial intrusions 
into the province of the jury.  Consider, for example, United States v. 
Wonson,
38
 in which then-Judge Story authored the first judicial opinion 
interpreting the Seventh Amendment.
39
  In Wonson, the government 
challenged the accuracy of a jury verdict, and asked the appellate court to 
reverse the verdict or resubmit the case to a new jury.
40
  Judge Story began 
his analysis by noting that, ―when then constitution [sic] was submitted to 
the people for adoption, one of the most powerful objections urged against 
it was, that in civil causes it did not secure the trial of facts by a jury.‖41  He 
reasoned that the Framers passed the Seventh Amendment ―to remove the 
weight of this objection‖ and prevent judges from intruding—either directly 
or indirectly—into the province of the jury.42  Thus, because he was  
 
 
36. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), in THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED 
BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 504 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) 
(quoting Judge William Blackstone). 
37. Lisa S. Meyer, Note, Taking the “Complexity” Out of Complex Litigation: Preserving the 
Constitutional Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 348 (1993). 
38. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16750). 
39. See id.; see also James L. ―Larry‖ Wright & M. Matthew Williams, Remember the Alamo: The 
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on 
Jury Awards, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449, 467 (2004) (―The most influential case in the initial development 
of the Seventh Amendment‘s historical test came from a Massachusetts federal circuit court [in 
Wonson].‖). 
40. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 745. 
41. Id. at 750. 
42. Id.  Judge Story‘s analysis on this point parallels Anti-federalist criticisms of the proposed 
Constitution.  The Anti-federalists alleged that, without a constitutional guarantee to the right to a civil 
jury trial, appellate courts could essentially ―gut the authority of . . .  juries by redetermining ‗law and 
fact.‘‖  Krauss, supra note 31, at 412. 
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constitutionally prohibited from reexamining the jury‘s factual 
determinations, Judge Story denied the government‘s request for relief.43 
The Wonson decision embraced an extremely limited role for judges in 
civil jury trials.  The Seventh Amendment carved out an adjudicatory 
function that federal judges simply cannot perform: finding facts.  Judge 
Story‘s analysis treated the civil jury as an independent constitutional actor, 
not unlike a fourth branch of government.
44
  As such, the jury has a 
constitutionally protected sphere of fact-finding power with which the other 
branches of government—specifically the judiciary—are prohibited from 
interfering.
45
 
 
B.  The Supreme Court‘s ―Historical Test‖ 
Until recently, the Supreme Court has followed Judge Story‘s analysis 
and used the history of the Seventh Amendment as a jurisprudential tool to 
maintain the exclusive fact-finding authority of civil juries.
46
  The Court‘s 
method of analyzing Seventh Amendment questions—sometimes called the 
―historical test‖—hinges upon the Amendment‘s reference to ―preserving‖ 
the right to a civil jury trial.
47
  The scope of the right thus depends on when 
the amendment became effective.
48
  As the Court has stated, ―[b]ecause the 
Seventh Amendment demands preservation of the jury trial right, our cases 
have uniformly held that the content of the right must be judged by 
historical standards.‖49 
For that reason, the Court has consistently referred to English trial 
practice circa 1791 when determining the appropriate scope of the right to a 
trial by jury in civil cases.
50
  More than any other constitutional provision, a 
proper analysis of the Seventh Amendment depends on the historical setting 
 
43. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750–51.  Of course, appellate courts maintain the power to set aside jury 
verdicts for errors of law.  Id. at 750. 
44. See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 
1870 (2008). 
45. Id. at 1869. 
46. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (―Since Justice Story‘s day, we 
have understood that the right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English 
common law when the Amendment was adopted.‖ (citation omitted)). 
47. David L. Shapiro & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on 
Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 448 (1971). 
48. Cf. id. at 449 (―[W]e do not see how an historical inquiry can be avoided when a [S]eventh 
[A]mendment question is raised.‖). 
49. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 344 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
50. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 640; see also Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 
(1913) (stating that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to civil jury trials as it ―existed under 
the English common law when the amendment was adopted‖). 
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in which the amendment was adopted.
51
  This referential interpretive 
framework means that English common law defines the scope of the 
American right to a civil jury trial.
52
  The Court‘s interpretation of the 
Seventh Amendment, therefore, has remained largely stagnant for the past 
two centuries.
53
 
 
C.  Modernizing the Right to a Civil Jury Trial 
The demands of modern day trial practice have forced the Court to 
abandon a strict legal orthodoxy of per se compliance with the antiquated 
features of the English jury.
54
  Quite simply, modern civil disputes do not 
resemble those from 1791, and the American legal system needs to adapt.  
Blind adherence to English common law would ―place modern judicial 
administration in an historical straight jacket, controlled by the policies of a 
society 200 years ago.‖55 
Recognizing that such historical dependency could threaten rational legal 
development, the Court has permitted some modern deviation from English 
common law.  Its new jurisprudential course preserves the substance of 
common law civil jury trials—in particular the jury‘s power to find facts—
while simultaneously allowing procedural modifications in the interest of 
efficiency.
56
  Put another way, the Seventh Amendment ―preserve[s] the 
basic institution of the jury trial... not the great mass of procedural forms 
and details.‖57  The constitutionality of a legal reform that alters any feature 
of the common law jury thus ―resolves itself into a question of what 
 
51. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 339–40. 
52. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 641; see also United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1812) (No. 16750) (―Beyond all question, the common law [referred to in the Seventh 
Amendment] is not the common law of any individual state . . . but it is the common law of England, the 
grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.‖).  For a critique of the Court‘s historical mode of analysis and 
an explanation for how it can be traced to Judge Story‘s opinion in Wonson, see generally Klein, supra 
note 27, at 1020–30, and Krauss, supra note 31, at 460–78. 
53. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 649. 
54. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 161 (1973) (discussing why the Seventh Amendment did not 
―saddle archaic and presently unworkable common-law procedures upon the federal courts‖ or ―nullify 
innovative changes‖ to modern day trials).  But cf. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (―The 
federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength.‖). 
55. Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational 
Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 487 (1975); see also id. at 530 (―[N]o constitutional provision 
can be interpreted in a social vacuum.‖). 
56. Henderson, supra note 9, at 336; cf. Meyer, supra note 37, at 346 (―[C]ourts have . . . held that the 
purpose of the Seventh Amendment was to preserve the substance of the jury trial right rather than the 
exact details of the procedure as it existed in 1791.‖). 
57. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943). 
  
488 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIV:401 
requirements are fundamental and what are unessential.‖58 
English common law, for example, guaranteed civil plaintiffs the right to 
a twelve-person jury,
59
 and for many years, the Court maintained that a 
guarantee to a ―trial by jury‖ meant ―a trial by a jury of twelve.‖60  But in 
1970, the Court permitted federal judges to empanel civil juries of six, 
reasoning that the historical requirement of twelve jurors was incidental to 
the common law right to a jury trial.
61
  Federal courts were thus free to 
modify the composition of civil juries, but, importantly, not free to alter the 
jury‘s essential fact-finding function.62  The former legal reform is 
sufficiently peripheral to the Seventh Amendment‘s guarantee; the latter 
strikes at its core.  Put another way, the qualities of juries may change, but 
the right to jury trial may not.
63
 
This distinction between the fundamental and unessential qualities of 
civil juries is important.  Modern legal developments—such as the 
increasing complexity and size of civil suits
64—have pressured our justice 
system to resolve disputes more efficiently.
65
  The system has responded to 
this pressure by reducing jury sizes, promulgating new rules of evidence, 
 
58. Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 
671 (1918) (emphasis added). 
59. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899). 
60. Id.; see also Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900). 
61. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973) (―[A] jury of six satisfies the Seventh Amendment‘s 
guarantee of trial by jury in civil cases.‖); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970) 
(describing the twelve person jury as an ―historical accident‖); JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: 
THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 180 (1994) (―[T]he Court reasoned that the number 
twelve was a fluke of history unrelated to the core functions of the jury.‖). 
62. Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 
293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (―Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and 
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a 
jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.‖). 
63. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 345 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (―If a 
jury would have been impaneled in a particular kind of case in 1791, then the Seventh Amendment 
requires a jury trial today, if either party so desires.‖); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) 
(―[The] thrust of the [Seventh] Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791.‖); 
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 n.18 (1959) (―This Court has long emphasized the 
importance of the jury trial.‖); Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (―The 
aim of the Amendment, as this Court has held, is to preserve the substance of the common-law right of 
trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of form or procedure.‖); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 
109–10 (1891) (―In the Federal courts this [jury] right cannot be dispensed with, except by the assent of 
the parties entitled to it.‖). 
64. See infra Part III.D. 
65. See John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 675, 686 (1984) (―The increased use of scientific evidence, the trend toward a more 
relaxed standard of admissibility, and the increasing number of suits involving science and technology 
will compound the problem of delay.  Thus, scientific evidence often creates additional burdens of 
manageability and poses serious problems of judicial administration.‖). 
  
2011] JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING 489 
and updating antiquated rules of procedure
66—all of which have changed 
the institutional framework within which litigants assert their Seventh 
Amendment rights.  Many of these institutional modifications are 
constitutionally permissible.  Legal developments that merely change the 
form of civil jury trials remain sufficiently detached from the core right 
preserved in the Seventh Amendment.
67
  Yet other changes in the law can 
go—and have gone—too far.68  One of the key challenges for our legal 
system, therefore, is modernizing judicial administration without 
circumventing the constitutional right to civil jury trials.  Federal courts are 
not bound to follow England‘s rules of evidence from 1791,69 but they are 
bound to respect civil litigants‘ right to a trial by jury.  As then-Justice 
Rehnquist stated in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 
To say that the Seventh Amendment does not tie federal courts to the exact 
procedure of the common law in 1791 doesnot imply, however, that any 
nominally ―procedural‖ change can be implemented, regardless of its impact on 
the functions of the jury.  For to sanction creation of procedural devices which 
limit the province of the jury to a greater degree than permitted at common law 
in 1791 is in direct contravention of the Seventh Amendment.
70
 
In other words, any legal reform that erodes the jury‘s historical fact-finding 
function is unconstitutional. 
 
D.  The Challenges of Complex Evidence 
Striking the constitutional balance between improving judicial 
administration and preserving the jury‘s fact-finding primacy is not easy, 
and the increased complexity of modern day civil litigation has made 
achieving this balance even more challenging.  In recent years, for example, 
the number of science-based grievances reaching the courtroom has 
increased substantially.
71
  ―Few dispute that litigation today deals with more 
 
66. See Gasoline Prod. Co., 283 U.S. at 498. 
67. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 735 (―What is said to be preserved is not the institution of jury trial as 
it then existed . . . but rather the ‗right‘ to jury trial.‖); see also Gasoline Prod. Co., 283 U.S. at 498 
(distinguishing between the ―form‖ and ―substance‖ of Seventh Amendment guarantees); cf. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 38(a) (―The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution . . . 
shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.‖). 
68. See infra Part V. 
69. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943) (―The Amendment did not bind the federal 
courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law of 1791, any 
more than it tied them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then 
prevailing.‖). 
70. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 345–46 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
71. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 97 (1990); see also Adam Siegel, Note, Setting Limits on Judicial Scientific, Technical, and 
Other Specialized Fact-Finding in the New Millennium, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 167 n.1 (2000) 
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complex scientific issues than it did in the past.‖72  Many civil trials now 
take months to complete, entail multiple parties, and involve vast quantities 
of evidence.
73
  ―This combination of factors results in cases so complicated 
that they are difficult for both attorneys and courts to manage and for any of 
the trial participants, including juries, to understand.‖74  Such complex cases 
raise serious questions regarding whether the scientifically unsophisticated 
fact-finder is, or should be, able to decide between the two competing 
versions of ―truth‖ presented in the courtroom.75 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, many scholars and judges 
questioned whether jurors could even comprehend the evidence of complex 
civil litigation.  According to one commentator: ―It is difficult to believe 
that lay jurors can be thrust into a complicated antitrust or shareholder 
derivative action and, on the basis of conflicting expert testimony, 
determine whether a challenged business practice is improper.‖76  Chief 
Justice Warren Burger further attacked the fact-finding abilities of modern 
juries by ―suggest[ing] that jurors lack the abilities required to deal with the 
complex issues often presented in federal civil trials.‖77 
To be sure, not all courts and commentators demeaned juror intelligence 
at the end of the twentieth century.
78
  But a broad consensus did exist that 
the increasingly complex scientific evidence of civil litigation raised serious 
questions about the propriety and viability of the jury‘s historical fact-
finding primacy.  The layperson jury simply seemed incapable of properly 
understanding and weighing this new evidence.
79
  For that reason, there was 
 
(compiling cases). 
72. Eugene Morgulis, Note, Juror Reactions to Scientific Testimony: Unique Challenges in Complex 
Mass Torts, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 252, 270 (2009). 
73. Meyer, supra note 37, at 337–38. 
74. Id. at 338. 
75. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 43 
(1995). 
76. Redish, supra note 55, at 505. 
77. Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: 
Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 733 & n.37 (1991) (reviewing Chief Justice 
Burger‘s criticisms of the modern jury). 
78. See, e.g., In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 429–30 (9th Cir. 1979) (―The opponents of the 
use of juries in complex civil cases generally assume that jurors are incapable of understanding 
complicated matters.  This argument unnecessarily and improperly demeans the intelligence of the 
citizens of this Nation.  We do not accept such an assertion.‖); Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604, 606 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying a motion to quash a jury demand because, although the case was a complex 
derivative class action, it was not beyond the practical abilities of a jury); Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. Int‘l 
Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (rejecting plaintiff‘s request for a bench trial because 
the jury was able to understand the complex trademark infringement issues involved in the case); see 
also infra Part V.C. 
79. For a review of the legal climate surrounding the admissibility of expert evidence in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, see Amy T. Schultz, The New Gatekeepers: Judging Scientific Evidence in a Post-Frye 
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a clear trend in the 1980s ―to diminish the role of the jury in civil actions.‖80  
And in 1993, the Supreme Court continued this trend when it issued 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
81
 
IV.  THE DAUBERT TRILOGY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
A.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
In Daubert, the Court responded to the increased complexity of modern 
day litigation by outlining a gatekeeping function for judges when parties 
seek to introduce expert testimony at trial.
82
  According to the Court, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (―Rule 702‖) obligates trial judges to ―ensure 
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable.‖83  As a threshold matter,84 trial judges should exclude 
expert testimony if they determine that such evidence will not reliably assist 
the jury in ascertaining disputed facts.
85
  The Daubert opinion thus 
―deputizes federal judges as amateur scientist gatekeepers.‖86  If the 
proposed scientific evidence is reliable, the judge may permit its 
presentation to the jury; if it is unreliable, the judge will keep the evidence 
from the jury. 
To help judges perform this new gatekeeping duty, the Daubert opinion 
outlined general components of ―good science,‖ such as whether an expert‘s 
proposed theory or technique has been tested, subjected to peer review and 
published, or sufficiently investigated to establish margins of error.
87
  These 
factors are only guidelines.  Daubert did not ―hand judges a step-by-step 
 
World, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1060 (1994). 
80. Paul B. Weiss, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 737, 764 (1989). 
81. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
82. Id. at 585. 
83. Id. at 589. 
84. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1556 (1995). 
85. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
86. Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 
291 (2007). 
87. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.  Before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, many 
federal courts followed the dictates of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and 
determined the admissibility of scientific evidence by looking exclusively at its ―general acceptance‖ in 
the scientific community.  Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  Daubert, however, relegated this once-controlling 
inquiry into just one of several factors that determine admissibility.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 
(―Frye made ‗general acceptance‘ the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony.  That 
austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be 
applied in federal trials.‖). 
  
492 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIV:401 
guide to applying scientific principles.‖88  Trial court judges—who often 
lack scientific sophistication
89—thus maintain considerable discretion over 
what expert evidence, if any, ultimately reaches the jury. 
 
B.  General Electric Co. v. Joiner 
The Court further defined the role of the Daubert gatekeeper in General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner.
90
  There, the Court held that appellate courts should 
use the highly deferential ―abuse of discretion‖ standard when reviewing a 
trial court‘s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert.91  
Joiner is also notable because it advised federal judges to conduct an 
inquiry into the basis of proposed expert testimony.
92
  This inquiry helps to 
ensure that opinion evidence is connected to reliable science by more than 
simply ―ipse dixit of the expert.‖93  Put another way, trial judges should 
focus on the science underlying an expert‘s opinion, not merely the 
witness‘s conclusions derived therefrom.94  If expert testimony strays too 
far from reliable science, the trial court must exclude the testimony.
95
 
In short, Joiner substantially broadened and deepened the judicial 
gatekeeping responsibilities outlined in Daubert.  Federal judges must now 
scrutinize the factual predicates of expert opinions to determine whether 
they comport with principles of reliable science. 
 
C.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 
The third and final case of the Daubert trilogy is Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael.
96
  In Kumho, the Supreme Court clarified that Daubert‘s 
gatekeeping requirement applies to all expert testimony, regardless of 
 
88. Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 84, at 1556–57. 
89. See infra Part V.C. 
90. 522 U.S. 136, 142–43 (1997). 
91. Id. at 138–39. 
92. Cf. id. at 147 (Breyer, J., concurring) (―The Court‘s opinion, which I join, emphasizes Daubert‘s 
statement that a trial judge, acting as a ‗gatekeeper‘, must ‗ensure that any and all scientific testimony or 
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.‘‖ (citation omitted)). 
93. Id. at 146 (majority opinion); see also Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony: The Supreme Court’s 
Rules, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., 57, 61 (2000) (―[S]terling credentials are not enough. . . .  [A]n expert‘s 
outstanding qualifications will not make the expert‘s opinion admissible unless the expert has a valid 
basis for how and why a conclusion was reached.‖). 
94. ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 11 (2007). 
95. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146–47. 
96. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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whether it is based on professional studies or personal experience.
97
  Rule 
702 ―makes no relevant distinction between ‗scientific‘ knowledge and 
‗technical‘ or ‗other specialized‘ knowledge.‖98  Accordingly, Kumho held 
that trial judges have gatekeeping power to exclude all proposed expert  
testimony from trial proceedings.  District judges now have incredible 
―discretionary authority‖—reversible only on grounds of abuse—over what, 
if any, expert evidence ultimately reaches the jury.
99
 
V.  JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING‘S THREAT TO THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
A.  Not Just Another Rule of Evidence 
The questions presented in the Daubert line of cases primarily involved 
the appropriate scope of Rule 702.
100
  Daubert may thus be viewed as just 
another evidentiary constraint limiting the jury‘s access to prejudicial or 
irrelevant evidence, much in the same way that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence generally prohibit hearsay or speculation.  This perspective, 
however, fails to appreciate the way that Daubert functions in modern day 
practice.  The Supreme Court may have intended Daubert to give federal 
judges gatekeeping power over evidence, but in practice, Daubert gives 
federal judges gatekeeeping power over the right to a civil jury trial. 
Consider, for example, toxic tort cases, where ―plaintiffs cannot prove 
that the defendants‘ pharmaceuticals or chemicals caused their damaged 
health without expert testimony on causation, the crucial issue in these 
cases.‖101  In many toxic tort disputes, judges use pre-trial ―Daubert 
hearings‖ to ―exclude so much of the evidence upon which plaintiffs intend 
to rely that a given case cannot proceed.‖102  Put another way, a trial judge‘s 
 
97. Id. at 152. 
98. Id. at 147. 
99. Id. at 158. 
100. Daubert involved whether amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Court‘s 
ruling in Frye v. United States.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).  
Joiner involved what standard of review applied to evidence excluded under Rule 702.  See Joiner, 522 
U.S. at 138–39.  Finally, Kumho involved what types of experts Rule 702 encompasses.  See Kumho, 
526 U.S. at 141; see also Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (―Daubert 
and Kumho were decided in the context of determining standards for the admissibility of expert 
testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . .‖). 
101. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the 
Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 21 (2008) (citation omitted). 
102. TELLUS INST., DAUBERT: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL SUPREME COURT RULING YOU‘VE NEVER 
HEARD OF 3(2003), http://www.defendingscience.org/upload/Daubert-The-Most-Influential-Supreme-
Court-Decision-You-ve-Never-Heard-Of-2003.pdf; cf. NICOLE L. WATERS & JESSICA P. HODGE, NAT‘L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE EFFECTS OF THE DAUBERT TRILOGY IN DELAWARE SUPERIOR COURT 21 
(2009), http://www.ncsonline.org/wc/publications/res_daubert_effdaubdelawaresupctfinal.pdf (―Civil 
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decision to exclude proposed expert testimony is outcome determinative: 
the evidentiary ruling leads directly to a summary judgment dismissal,  
thereby blocking the case from ever reaching a jury.
103
  Other Federal Rules 
of Evidence may prevent litigants from introducing certain evidence at trial, 
but rarely do they prevent entire cases from reaching a jury altogether. 
Indeed, modern day ―[f]ederal jurisprudence is largely the product of 
summary judgment.‖104  Since Daubert, the frequency of motions for 
summary judgment in civil litigation has increased significantly, as has the 
frequency with which judges grant such motions.
105
  Daubert has thus 
transferred substantial case disposition power away from juries and into the 
hands of judges.  Chief Justice Feldman of the Arizona Supreme Court 
found this shift particularly troubling: 
In my mind, Daubert gives trial judges far more authority over civil cases than 
they ought to have.... What I feared would happen eventually, and what has 
happened, is that instead of having jury trials we now have Daubert hearings 
before the judge.  The judge, in effect, then determines the outcome of the case 
by granting summary judgment.  To my mind, this far exceeds any power that 
the Constitution gave judges over jury trials.
106
 
Judicial gatekeeping is also troubling because federal judges have 
lengthy dockets, and consequently ―have an incentive to dispose of cases 
quickly.‖107  In turn, judges may use their gatekeeping discretion to exclude 
evidence and grant summary judgment in a greater percentage of cases than 
 
defense attorneys, by and large, filed the majority of motions to challenge expert testimony.  The 
differential impact of these motions was realized by civil plaintiffs, due to the potential dispositive 
nature of the motion against a lone expert.‖). 
103. Weinstein, supra note 101, at 21–22; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 
U.S. 308, 327 n.8 (2007) (―In numerous contexts, gatekeeping judicial determinations prevent 
submission of claims to a jury‘s judgment . . . .‖); WATERS & HODGE, supra note 102, at 1 (arguing that 
―[e]liminating an expert witness may dispose a case‖); id. at 15 (―The impact of the bench rulings on 
admissibility of experts influences the disposition.  For instance, if a plaintiff‘s lone expert is excluded, 
typically the case is resolved by either a summary judgment or a directed verdict.‖); TELLUS INST., 
supra note 102, at 3 (―Polluters and manufacturers of dangerous products are successfully using Daubert 
to keep juries from hearing scientific or any other evidence against them.‖). 
104. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (1998). 
105. See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS 
FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION 56 (2001); 
see also Royal Furgeson, Civil Jury Trials R.I.P.? Can It Actually Happen in America?, 40 ST. MARY‘S 
L.J. 795, 826 (2009) (providing an anecdotal discussion of how the Daubert trilogy has ―spawned a 
substantial number of challenges to experts in a vast number of cases‖).  But cf. ERIC HELLAND & 
JONATHAN KLICK, DOES ANYONE GET STOPPED AT THE GATE? AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
DAUBERT TRILOGY IN THE STATES (2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/270 (reporting 
that state court adoption of the Daubert standard produces no effect on what type of experts are called to 
testify at trial). 
106. TELLUS INST., supra note 102, at 13 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
107. A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies Tell Us About the 
Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 117 (2005). 
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may be justified.
108
  Put another way, ―Daubert gives a powerful tool to 
judges with incentives to dismiss.‖109  Such potential for judicial oppression 
is precisely what the Founders intended to prevent with the Seventh 
Amendment.
110
 
Daubert thus provides judges with the awesome—and unique—power to 
stop a case from proceeding to a jury based solely on an evidentiary 
ruling.
111
  ―[T]he judge[,] acting as a gatekeeper at a Daubert hearing[,]... is 
essentially blocking a litigant‘s right to a jury trial.‖112  Federal trial judges 
are acting as jury gatekeepers; to access the jury, a litigant must first go 
through the judge.  This judicial control over the right to civil jury trials 
undermines the fundamental guarantee of the Seventh Amendment.
113
  As 
one scholar described: 
Daubert affects pretrial practices like discovery and summary judgment far 
more than trial, the supposed domain of rules of evidence.  In the name of 
Daubert and Evidence, judges who so choose have a powerful tool with which 
to manipulate the American system of adjudication and bypass the Seventh 
Amendment.
114
 
Not only are gatekeeping judges resolving factual disputes among 
opposing witnesses, but they are also resolving such disputes in a way that 
―poses a threat to the continued viability of the Seventh Amendment jury 
trial.‖115 
The threat that Daubert gatekeeping poses to jury trials becomes 
particularly clear with an appreciation of the extensive use of expert 
testimony in civil litigation.  One pre-Daubert study of jury verdicts in 
California reported that experts testified in eighty-six percent of civil jury 
trials.
116
  In most of these cases, both parties called expert witnesses,
117
 and 
 
108. Id. 
109. Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 298.  ―If a court is unwilling or unable to try cases, Daubert 
certainly can be abused.  The opportunity to dismiss a case which should be heard by a jury is within 
every judge‘s grasp.‖  Id. 
110. See supra notes 4–18 and accompanying text; see also Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 307 
(arguing that Daubert gives judges the opportunity to inject their personal preferences into the American 
judicial system). 
111. Cf. TELLUS INST., supra note 102, at 16 (noting that the Daubert line of cases ―hand[s] judges 
extensive powers for deciding not only whether complex evidence should be allowed into the 
courtroom, but whether the case should move forward at all when there are differences of opinion 
among experts‖). 
112. Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 292. 
113. Cf. supra Part II. 
114. Weinstein, supra note 101, at 22 (emphasis added); see also id. at 105 (noting how Daubert has 
highlighted the ―reluctance‖ of courts ―to allow juries to decide cases‖). 
115. Id. at 112. 
116. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1991). 
117. Id. at 1120. 
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an average of 3.8 experts testified per trial.
118
  This widespread use of 
expert testimony in civil litigation, which is expected to increase in the 
future,
119
 highlights the extraordinary opportunity for judges to prevent 
cases from proceeding to a jury, especially because defendants are 
increasingly using Daubert hearings as a litigation strategy.  One study of 
state civil cases reported that defendants challenged plaintiffs‘ expert 
witness proffers eighty-two percent of the time.
120
  Almost half of these 
challenges were successful.
121
 
 
B.  Gatekeeping in Practice 
1.  Judicial Fact-Finding 
The nature of Daubert evidentiary decision-making further highlights the 
distinction between it and other rules of evidence.  For instance, when 
ruling on a liability insurance objection, the judge simply determines 
whether a party is offering evidence of insurance to prove negligence.
122
  
The judicial inquiry is similarly straightforward with criminal history, 
character, and hearsay evidence, for which the Federal Rules of Evidence 
are fairly easy to apply; judges frequently rule on such objections at trial 
with little or no argument from counsel. 
But ruling on a Daubert objection is entirely different.  ―In their role as 
amateur scientists, [gatekeeper] judges examine a theory, gather opposing 
facts about it, and then attempt to make a ‗reasoned judgment‘ about which 
set of facts are [sic] correct.‖123  Sorting out conflicting facts and 
determining the appropriate credence to give competing expert witnesses, 
however, is the constitutionally safeguarded purpose of the jury.
124
  Daubert 
thus robs the jury of its role as arbiter of the weight and credibility of  
 
118. Id. at 1119. 
119. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge Critically 
Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury’s Province to Evaluate the 
Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 6 (2000). 
120. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being 
Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 110–11 (2000). 
121. Id. at 111. 
122. FED. R. EVID. 411. 
123. Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 291–92; see also David M. Malone & Paul J. Zwier, 
Epistemology After Daubert, Kumho Tire, and the New Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 
103, 106 (2001) (arguing that Daubert ―empowers the trial judge to cross the line between making a 
legal determination and making a final fact determination‖). 
124. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 902 (1983); see also United States v. Cisneros, 203 F.3d 333, 
343 (5th Cir. 2000) (―Credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the jury . . . .‖ (citation 
omitted)); Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 292. 
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evidence.
125
  In Wonson, Judge Story outlined a bright line rule that the 
Seventh Amendment prevents judges from interfering with the civil jury‘s 
fact-finding domain.  Daubert violates that rule. 
 
2.  Increased Costs, Decreased Jury Trials 
Before the Court issued Daubert, litigants challenged the admissibility of 
expert testimony during trial.
126
  After Daubert, however, litigants raise the 
majority of such challenges in motions in limine.
127
  These motions usually 
lead to Daubert hearings, which resemble full trials: the judge presides, the 
expert is cross examined, and a stenographer creates a transcript.
128
  
Daubert hearings are essentially ―dry runs‖ of jury trials,129 and can be one 
of the most expensive, adversarial, and time-consuming phases of 
litigation.
130
 
The additional cost of Daubert hearings can itself be a barrier to jury 
trials.  Large law firms, for example, may request a Daubert hearing to 
drive up litigation costs and disadvantage smaller, opposing firms.
131
  
Litigants seeking to utilize expert testimony must now pay for and conduct 
two trials: one before the gatekeeping judge and one (potentially) before the 
jury.  These costs can be prohibitive to litigants—usually plaintiffs—
seeking access to jury trials.
132
  Defending a Daubert motion ―can cost 
 
125. See Brief for Ass‘n of Trial Lawyers for Pub. Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709), 1998 WL 734430, at *22 
[hereinafter Brief for Trial Lawyers]. 
126. DAVID M. FLORES ET AL., EFFECTS OF DAUBERT ON EXPERT EVIDENCE PRACTICES IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA 30 (2008),  
http://www.defendingscience.org/courts/upload/SKAPP-PROJECT-FINAL-REPORT-3-18-08.pdf. 
127. Id. at 19. 
128. See Thomas G. Gutheil & Harold J. Bursztajn, Attorney Abuses of Daubert Hearings: Junk 
Science, Junk Law, or Just Plain Obstruction?, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 150, 152 (2005). 
129. Id. at 151. 
130. Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 324. 
131. Gutheil & Bursztajn, supra note 128, at 152. 
132. According to one scholar: 
Separate Daubert hearings can be quite expensive, consuming many hours of attorney 
and expert witness time.  The prospect of shepherding expert witnesses through 
depositions and Daubert hearings in which opposing attorneys launch intensive attacks 
on the corpuscles of the relevant scientific studies, as well as on the expert witnesses‘ 
own conclusions, may be enough to discourage even the most aggressive trial attorney 
from taking even the most meritorious cases in which causation in fact is a seriously 
contested issue. 
Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-Based 
Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 
52 KAN. L. REV. 897, 933 (2004). 
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plaintiffs hundreds and thousands of dollars.‖133 
This substantial expense may help to explain why the number of toxic 
tort jury trials has steadily decreased in the years following Daubert.
134
  
Defendants began using Daubert motions to drive up plaintiffs‘ costs and 
erect ―smoke screens‖ that attack well-regarded experts simply to prevent 
cases from proceeding to trial.
135
  In one study of Daubert‘s impact within 
the Delaware Superior Court,
136
 plaintiffs‘ attorneys expressed concern 
about ―the additional costs and fees that arise out of the discovery process 
and depositions of experts in response to a Daubert challenge.‖137  These 
extra costs likely contributed to Delaware‘s ―clear trend‖ away from jury 
trials in post-Daubert case dispositions.
138
  Similar trends exist in the 
federal courts: despite an increase in litigation over the past few decades, 
the number of federal civil trials between 1992 and 2002 decreased by 
twenty-eight percent.
139
 
 
C.  Are Judges Better Equipped Than Juries To Decide the Reliability of 
Expert Evidence? 
One theme present throughout the Daubert trilogy is the underlying fear 
that unsophisticated jurors will ―fall prey to cunning expert witnesses‖ and 
return verdicts inconsistent with reliable science.
140
  ―[T]he Supreme 
Court‘s overriding concern... was with the problem of jury exposure to 
confusing and unreliable expert testimony.‖141  In other words, the Court 
 
133. TELLUS INST., supra note 102, at 12. 
134. Id. 
135. Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 306. 
136. In 1999, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Daubert trilogy as binding precedent within the 
state court system.  See M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999). 
137. WATERS & HODGE, supra note 102, at 18. 
138. Id. 
139. Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 30 ABA J. SEC. LITIG. 2, 2 (2004) (reporting that federal 
courts held 4,279 jury trials in 1992, but only 3,006 in 2002).  ―[O]ur federal courts actually tried fewer 
cases in 2002 than they did in 1962, despite a fivefold increase in the number of civil filings.‖  Id. 
(emphasis omitted); cf. Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 315 (reporting that the number of federal civil 
jury trials between 1985 and 2003 decreased by 79%) (citing Leonard Post, Federal Tort Trials 
Continue Downward Spiral, NAT‘L L.J., Aug. 22, 2005, at 1).  For a discussion about why the rate of 
civil jury trials has decreased—including a discussion of Daubert—see Furgeson, supra note 105, at 
813–90.  See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor, Robert C. LaFountain & Shauna Strickland, Trial Trends 
and Implications for the Civil Justice System, 11 CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/csp/highlights/highlights_main_page.html (follow ―Trial Trends 
and Implications for the Civil Justice System‖ hyperlink under ―Title‖ to download ―PDF‖) (discussing 
the causes and implications of the ―vanishing‖ civil jury trial). 
140. David J. Damiani, Proposals for Reform in the Evaluation of Expert Testimony in Pharmaceutical 
Mass Tort Cases, 13 ALB. L. J. SCI. TECH. 517, 546 (2003). 
141. Loeffel Steel Prod. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
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was worried that, in the presence of conflicting testimony about complex 
evidence, jurors would decide cases based not upon an appropriate 
comprehension of the evidence, but upon some other superficial factor.  
Daubert further assumes that judges will not suffer from these 
shortcomings because they are better equipped than jurors—through 
education, experience, or sophistication—to determine the validity and 
reliability of expert evidence.
142
 
This reasoning is questionable at best.
143
  Legal expertise does not equate 
to scientific expertise.  Most judges lack formal scientific training, and 
when it comes to understanding and assessing expert testimony, they are 
laypeople—just like most jurors—who struggle to comprehend complex 
evidence.
144
  Daubert thus transferred authority to determine the credibility 
and reliability of expert testimony from non-expert juries to non-expert 
judges.
145
 
One survey of state trial court judges found that only six percent of them 
properly understood the scientific meaning of falsifiability, a key principle 
used to assess the merits of scientific evidence.
146
  The authors of that study 
questioned whether judges could properly administer the Daubert criteria 
given their ―lack of sophistication‖ regarding important principles of 
scientific validity.
147
  In other words, judicial gatekeeping ―is likely to  
 
 
142. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 
1535, 1678 (1998) (noting that Daubert assumes that judges are ―in a significantly better epistemic 
position to decide whether proffered scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admissible in a trial 
before a nonexpert jury‖); Damiani, supra note 140, at 545–46 (―Concerns over expert testimony lie at 
the heart of the real and proposed authority shift to judges; Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho operate on the 
theory that the evidence rules give experts excessive authority and make jurors excessively vulnerable.‖ 
(quotation omitted)). 
143. See Brief for Neil Vidmar et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709), 1998 WL 734434, at *14 [hereinafter Brief for 
Vidmar] (―None of the studies [on jurors‘ ability to comprehend complex evidence] produced any 
evidence that in the face of complicated testimony jurors simply deferred to the experts and suspended 
their responsibility to make the best judgment that they could.‖). 
144. Wesley, supra note 65, at 685.  Indeed, empirical evidence reveals substantial similarities between 
how judges and juries scrutinize and weigh evidence.  See Brief for Vidmar, supra note 143, at **7–10 
(reviewing studies showing trial judges‘ and experts‘ agreement with jury verdicts). 
145. Brewer, supra note 142, at 1678; cf. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 188 
(2007) (―The difficulties that both judges and juries face in evaluating expert evidence challenge the 
easy assumption that, because of education or experience, a trial judge deciding alone will more often 
than not do better than the jury in judging scientific expert testimony.‖). 
146. Sophia I. Gatowksi et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert 
Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 444–45 & fig.1 (2001). 
147. Id. at 453. 
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produce inconsistent, arbitrary, and unpredictable results‖148—the very sort 
of judge-made injustices that our Founding Fathers sought to eliminate 
when they passed the Seventh Amendment.
149
 
Furthermore, empirical investigations of jury decision-making tend to 
disprove criticisms of the jury‘s ability to understand complex cases.150  In a 
1991 study, a group of legal scholars identified a ―sharp contrast‖ between 
the research and popular legal opinion regarding jury competence.
151
  
According to the study, the weight of available research showed that jurors 
were ―remarkably adept‖ fact-finders whose capabilities even ―extend[ed] 
to cases of the greatest complexity.‖152  Although jurors may struggle to 
comprehend complex litigation, ―there is no firm evidence that their 
judgments have therefore been wrong.‖153 
In sum, Daubert assumes that judges are better able than jurors to 
understand and scrutinize expert testimony.  This assumption is wrong; it 
rests on anecdotes, not data.  Available jury research shows that jurors 
can—and do—comprehend expert testimony at least as well as judges.154  
That is not to say that jurors do not struggle with complex evidence.  The 
point is simply that, in cases where jurors may have been confused, ―judges 
would have been equally confused.‖155  Both are likely to struggle and make 
mistakes.  But, as Thomas Jefferson once stated, the risk of an incorrect  
 
 
 
148. Vickers, supra note 107, at 120. 
149. Notably, because these non-expert judges may possess an incorrect understanding on scientific 
reliability, they may prevent experts from testifying for erroneous reasons.  See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC 
TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 16 (2006).  Poor implementation of the 
Daubert criteria can thus create improperly high barriers for plaintiffs seeking access to trials, thereby 
depriving litigants of their Seventh Amendment rights.  See id. at 17. 
150. See generally Cecil, Hans & Wiggins, supra note 77, at 744–75. 
151. Id. at 744. 
152. Id. at 745. 
153. Robert D. Myers, Ronald S. Reinstein & Gordon M. Griller, Complex Scientific Evidence and the 
Jury, 83 JUDICATURE 150, 152 (1999). 
154. Indeed, jurors may be better at scrutinizing expert evidence than judges because they share ideas 
and knowledge with one another.  This collaboration may lead to a collective wisdom superior to the 
individual wisdom of a trial court judge.  As the Ninth Circuit explained: 
While we express great confidence in the abilities of judges, no one has yet demonstrated 
how one judge can be a superior fact-finder to the knowledge and experience that citizen-
jurors bring to bear on a case.  We do not accept the underlying premise of appellees‘ 
argument, ―that a single judge is brighter than the jurors collectively functioning 
together.‖ 
In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). 
155. Brief for Vidmar, supra note 143, at *14. 
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jury verdict ―is less dangerous to the [S]tate, and less afflicting to the loser,‖ 
than leaving such power over the rights of litigants to the potentially 
oppressive decision of an unelected governmental actor.
156
 
VI.  ADAPTING THE JURY SYSTEM WITHOUT CIRCUMVENTING THE 
SEVENTH AMENDMENT: CHANGING THE UNESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE 
RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY TRIAL 
Daubert was the Supreme Court‘s response to the increasingly complex 
fact-finding demands of modern litigation.  The Court‘s response, however, 
was flawed.  Instead of helping jurors respond to the challenges of complex 
evidence, Daubert removed a portion of the jury‘s fact-finding authority 
and gave it to judges.  The Court decreased the jury‘s power to resolve civil 
disputes and increased the judge‘s power to control litigants‘ access to civil 
juries.  This major shift of adjudicatory authority is a fundamental change to 
the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.  And such fundamental 
changes are constitutionally impermissible.
157
 
This section briefly outlines three ways that the legal system can adapt to 
the challenges of modern day civil litigation without infringing on the 
essential functions of the American jury.  The goal here is not to provide a 
full defense of these proposals; instead, the objective is to demonstrate 
ways that the legal system can address the underlying concerns of Daubert 
without violating the Seventh Amendment.  These three proposals thus 
focus on enhancing—rather than circumventing—the fact-finding abilities 
of jurors.  Each proposal alters some unessential feature of the right to a 
jury trial, leaving the fundamental qualities of that right undisturbed. 
 
A.  Increase the Use of Court-Appointed Experts 
Because litigants present their cases within an adversarial system, their 
expert witnesses are likely to present one-sided, distorted perspectives on 
the evidence.
158
  These experts may become ―advocates for the side that 
hired them‖ and thus abandon objectivity in pursuit of victory at trial.159  As 
 
156. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 214–15 (1787); see also id. at 215 (―In 
truth, it is better to toss up cross and pile in a cause, than to refer it to a judge whose mind is warped by 
any motive whatever, in that particular case.‖). 
157. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
158. See Hyongsoon Kim, Adversarialism Defended: Daubert and the Judge’s Role in Evaluating 
Expert Evidence, 34 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 223, 226 (2001) (quotation omitted). 
159. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON, CAROL KRAFKA & JOE S. CECIL, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERT 
TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 5 (2000), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/exptesti.pdf/$file/exptesti.pdf. 
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a result, fact-finders—whether judge or jury—can be misled, confused, and 
frustrated.
160
  Daubert‘s solution to these problems was to eliminate a 
significant portion of the jury‘s fact-finding power.  A better, constitutional 
solution is to help jurors sort through the biased rhetoric and conflicting 
expert testimony by providing them with an objective framework within 
which to scrutinize such evidence. 
To provide this framework, judges should more frequently use their 
power under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 (―Rule 706‖), which authorizes 
them to appoint neutral experts to testify at trial alongside partisan experts 
called by litigants.
161
  These neutral experts will enhance each juror‘s ability 
to understand, assess, and evaluate the testimony of the litigants‘ experts.162  
―Appointing an expert enables a court to compensate for omissions and to 
obtain evidence, opinions, and explanations not presented by the parties.  
As such, this procedure promotes rational decision making and accurate 
decisions.‖163  Put simply, neutral experts will improve jury understanding 
of complex evidence, thus making it more likely that the ultimate verdict 
will be based on a proper understanding of the relevant facts. 
Admittedly, court-appointed experts are not a perfect solution to the 
increasingly complex nature of civil litigation.
164
  Because a court-
appointed expert may resolve disputes between the litigants‘ experts—and 
therefore be outcome determinative
165—judges have understandably been 
reluctant to exercise their authority under Rule 706.
166
  But limiting the 
 
160. See generally Jody Weisenberg Menon, Adversarial Medical and Scientific Testimony and Lay 
Jurors: A Proposal for Medical Malpractice Reform, 21 AM. J. L. MED. 281, 285–87 (1995) (discussing 
how adversarial legal systems can operate to confuse jurors). 
161. FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (―The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and 
may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.‖).  Notably, the Daubert opinion encourages judges 
to ―be mindful‖ of Rule 706 when performing their gatekeeping role.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). 
162. See Sophia Cope, Ripe for Revision: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and the Use of 
Court-Appointed Experts, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 163, 168 (2004). 
163. Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and 
Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 82 (1998). 
164. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1220 (―The essential flaw in the existing schemes for appointment of 
experts is the absence of incentives to use them.  Appointed experts are never required . . . .  Judges, 
even lawyers, may favor the practice in principle, but in the heat of a particular case appointed experts 
are always dispensable.‖).  See generally Karen Butler Reisinger, Note, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: 
A Comparison of Two Models, 32 IND. L. REV. 225, 235–38 (1998) (reviewing scholarly criticisms of 
Rule 706). 
165. See, e.g., Hiern v. Sarpy, 161 F.R.D. 332, 336 (E.D. La. 1995) (―[A] danger exists that the 
appointed expert would side with either of the other experts, giving one side an inappropriate numerical 
advantage.‖); Deason, supra note 163, at 123 (―In a jury case, the concern is that the temptation for 
jurors to accept uncritically the views of any expert will be increased only if they perceive that the 
expert has the blessing of the court.‖). 
166. For example, Joe S. Cecil & Thomas S. Willging, Accepting Daubert‘s Invitation: Defining a Role 
for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004 (1994), found 
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scope of Rule 706 testimony may reduce some of this concern about court-
appointed experts acting as potential tiebreakers.  Their testimony, for 
example, could be limited to only background or educational information.  
The court-appointed expert would thus serve as ―a teacher who, unaffected 
by his having been called as a witness by one side or the other, can explain 
the technical significance of the evidence presented.‖167  The goal of such 
testimony would be to help the jury find facts, not to resolve the underlying 
dispute. 
In like manner, courts could delegate their expert appointment power to a 
qualified intermediary.  Professor Christopher Robertson has developed a 
legal reform procedure called ―blind expertise,‖ whereby an intermediary 
performs a ―double-blinding function‖ by soliciting expert opinions on 
behalf of the litigants.
168
  The expert would hence ―be unaware of whether 
the plaintiff or defendant was requesting the opinion.‖169  After receiving 
the expert‘s case assessment, the litigant could either (1) call the expert as a 
witness and disclose her identity to the opposition, or (2) treat the expert as 
a consultant, thereby shielding her opinion from discovery within the 
protective umbrella of the work product doctrine.
170
  Because blind experts 
shrouded in a ―veil of ignorance‖171 are more likely to render objective 
opinions, this procedure would enhance the overall accuracy of expert 
testimony presented to juries.  In turn, verdicts would more likely be based 
on reliable science and thus more likely be seen as legitimate, final, and 
factually correct.
172
  Although this blinding process cannot guarantee the 
truth of expert testimony—or the jury verdicts derived therefrom—it would 
―eliminate the litigant-induced selection, compensation, and affiliation 
biases that degrade the accuracy of litigation witnesses under the status 
quo.‖173  And it accomplishes all of this without eroding the jury‘s fact-
finding power. 
  
 
that only twenty percent of federal judges had appointed an independent expert. 
167. Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
168. Christopher T. Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 179 (2010). 
169. Id. at 208. 
170. See id. at 209–10. 
171. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971). 
172. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 190 (2004) (discussing the 
relationship among legal procedures, outcome accuracy, and perceived legitimacy of final judgments). 
173. Robertson, supra note 168, at 179. 
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B.  Improve Expert Witness Accountability 
Another way to help juries assess the complex evidence of modern civil 
litigation is by increasing the accountability of experts who testify at trial.
174
  
The key to this legal reform is the creation of an institutional incentive that 
discourages experts from testifying as partisan advocates.  Currently, 
scientific peers rarely evaluate their fellow expert‘s testimony for accuracy, 
and so witnesses may feel free to say in court what they would never say to 
colleagues.  As Professor Samuel Gross describes: 
One of the limiting features of our present system is its insularity; what an 
expert says in litigation is almost never exposed to a disinterested audience of 
the expert‘s professional colleagues.  As a result, an expert witness is rarely 
held accountable to those who are best able to evaluate her evidence, and 
whose opinion may matter most to her career and to her vanity.  Breaching this 
boundary would add a powerful incentive for care and for accuracy.
175
 
Professor Gross‘s solution to achieving increased accountability is for 
expert opinions to undergo a peer review process similar to that required for 
many scientific publications.
176
  This review process, however, would be 
time consuming, expensive, and dependent upon the cooperation of 
professional associations.
177
  In short, it would be impractical. 
Nonetheless, Professor Gross‘s solution appropriately focuses on 
increasing the transparency of expert testimony.  An alternative proposal is 
the creation of a statewide or national electronic database to warehouse 
transcripts of all expert testimony.
178
  Interested parties could then review 
the transcripts for whatever purpose.  The goal would be to create a level of 
transparency that maintains the accountability of expert witnesses—to their 
peers, future litigants, or the general public—long after they have left the 
isolated environment of the courtroom.  If witnesses know that their words 
will forever be available to the public at large, then they will, presumably, 
be more inclined toward cautious, accurate, and vigilant testimony, as 
opposed to biased testimony that is shaped by the party calling them.
179
 
 
174. Notably, the use of neutral, court-appointed expert witnesses should help to achieve such 
accountability.  If jurors have a basic understanding of the relevant science before partisan experts 
testify, then those experts would be less inclined to present biased or scientifically incomplete 
testimony: expert witnesses would presumably be more cautious if they are testifying to an educated 
jury.  Additionally, the mere presence of a scientific colleague (the neutral expert) in the courtroom 
might also reduce partisan expert ―lobbying.‖ 
175. Gross, supra note 116, at 1213. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 1214–15. 
178. The transcripts, of course, would be appropriately redacted. 
179. Cf. Wrobleski v. de Lara, 727 A.2d 930, 933 (Md. 1999) (discussing concerns surrounding a 
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C.  Let Jurors Ask Written Questions 
Perhaps the easiest way to help jurors understand complex evidence is to 
grant them the ability to submit written questions to expert witnesses.
180
  
Other important actors in the legal system already have this power.  Before 
trial, lawyers ask experts questions to better understand the merits of the 
case and focus court proceedings on the most important issues.
181
  During 
bench trials, judges also question expert witnesses to aid their own 
understanding of the facts.  But jurors—perhaps the most important 
decision-makers within the legal system—do not have the same opportunity 
to ask experts questions.
182
  ―It is time to end this nonsensical practice.‖183  
The legal system does not further justice by erecting institutional bars to 
resolving jury confusion about complex evidence. 
One model of this type of legal reform is found in the Arizona state 
courts, which currently permit jurors to take notes and direct questions to 
witnesses during trials.  One study of this system found that such 
questioning ―promote[d] juror understanding of the facts and issues.‖184  
Moreover, ―[b]y empowering jurors with the opportunity to ask questions, 
they become more attentive, even if they choose not to exercise the 
questioning option.‖185  Another study that reviewed jury questioning in 
New Jersey civil trials reported a widespread consensus among judges and 
trial attorneys that jurors become more attentive and better understand 
testimony after being permitted to ask witnesses questions.
186
 
 
testifying expert‘s ―bias[] or inclination in favor of the party by whom the witness is employed‖ (quoting 
William Foster, Expert Testimony – Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, Address Before the 
New Hampshire Medical Society (May 22, 1897), in 11 HARV. L. REV. 169, 171 (1897))). 
180. Juror questioning of witnesses was common practice in the 1800s, and many Anti-federalists 
intended that the jury play an active role at trials.  See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and 
Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 454–55 (1996); see also Jeffrey S. 
Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors be Allowed To Question Witnesses During Trial?, 
44 VAND. L. REV. 117, 124 (1991) (explaining that the historical practice of permitting juries to ask 
questions at trial became disfavored because ―[t]he modern Anglo-American judicial system places the 
primary responsibility for eliciting the facts and issues in a case on the parties presenting the evidence‖). 
181. Myers, Reinstein & Griller, supra note 153, at 154–55. 
182. Peter Lattman, Should a Jury be Able To Ask Questions During Trial?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2007, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/02/02/should-a-jury-be-able-to-ask-questions-during-a-trial/tab/article/ 
(last visited March 17, 2011) (reporting that only 15% of state courts and 8% of federal courts permit 
juries to submit questions during trial). 
183. Myers, Reinstein & Griller, supra note 153, at 155. 
184. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking and 
Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 260 (1996). 
185. Meyer, supra note 37, at 365. 
186. See REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF CIVIL PRESIDING JUDGES ON ITS EVALUATION OF JUROR 
QUESTION-ASKING PROCEDURES 10–11 (2006), available at  
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In sum, permitting jurors to ask questions engages them in the trial and 
provides them with an opportunity to resolve any confusion resulting from 
hearing complex expert testimony.  Indeed, when jurors are permitted to 
submit questions to witnesses, nearly half of the questions are directed to 
testifying experts.
187
  Furthermore, permitting jurors to ask questions ―helps 
the trial to be more than a mere contest of advocacy[]... [and] helps the trial 
to maintain a proper focus on the search for truth.‖188  And finding truth is, 
after all, a primary function of our legal system.
189
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Daubert encumbers the right to a civil jury trial in at least three ways: (1) 
by replacing jury fact-finding with judicial fact-finding, (2) by authorizing 
judges to dismiss cases that do not ―survive‖ Daubert hearings,190 and (3) 
by permitting litigants ―to spend an opponent into [a] disadvantageous 
settlement or to deter individuals from pursuing their legal rights in the first 
place.‖191  Within this context, Daubert is properly understood as a legal 
development that alters the fundamental substance of the Seventh 
Amendment right to a civil jury trial.  By giving judges the authority to 
resolve factual disputes and the corresponding discretion to prevent cases 
from ever reaching a jury, Daubert infringes on the core guarantee of the 
Seventh Amendment. 
 
 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/jurypilot/jurquest2.pdf. 
187. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Jurors’ Unanswered Questions, 41 CT. 
REV. 20, 22 (2004).  One jury, for example, asked a testifying physician, ―What is a tear of the 
meniscus?‖  Id. 
188. Eugene A. Lucci, The Case for Allowing Jurors to Submit Written Questions, 89 JUDICATURE 16, 
19 (2005).  ―Questioning facilitates juror understanding, attentiveness, and overall satisfaction, improves 
communications, and corrects erroneous juror beliefs.  Some contend it promotes the search for truth 
and justice.‖  Id.; see also Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 187, at 27 (―Jurors not only appreciate 
the opportunity to submit questions, but also formulate relevant questions to assist them in evaluating 
evidence.‖).  But see N. Randy Smith, Why I Do Not Let Jurors Ask Questions in Trials, 40 IDAHO L. 
REV. 553, 561 (2004) (arguing that jurors should not be permitted to ask questions at trial because it 
may inappropriately alter the plaintiff‘s burden of proof and create a biased trier of fact). 
189. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism of Junk 
Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 226 (2006).  But cf. Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596–97 (1993) (comparing the quest for truth in the courtroom with 
that of scientific analysis, and discussing the legal system‘s other—perhaps competing—goals of 
resolving disputes ―finally and quickly‖). 
190. WATERS & HODGE, supra note 102, at 18. 
191. Brief for Trial Lawyers, supra note 125, at *21; see also Gary Wilson, Vincent Moccio & Daniel 
O. Fallon, The Future of Products Liability in America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 85, 102 (2000) 
(―Losing [a Daubert] motion is devastating to the plaintiff‘s case, but even when the plaintiff prevails, 
an additional, and often expensive layer of motion practice, including a very expensive Daubert hearing, 
is added to the case.‖). 
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Of course, the legal system should adapt to the increasingly complex 
nature of civil litigation.  Theses adaptations, however, must create an 
institutional framework that helps juries find facts without intruding upon 
their constitutionally protected adjudicatory responsibilities.  Daubert fails 
to accomplish that objective. 
 
